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Inverse J-Shaped Relationship between Fertility and Gender Equality: 
Different Relationships of the Two Variables According to Income Levels 
 
Yoko Nakagaki* 
 
Abstract 
The fertility decline, which started first in developed countries, has been observed among most 
developing countries since the latter half of the 20th century. On the other hand, among 
developed countries, the long-lasting decline of fertility seems to have stopped in recent 
decades, and a modest recovery of fertility has been observed in most countries.  
A large number of studies focusing on the relationship between fertility and gender equality 
have been conducted. However, gender equality is composed of various aspects, and the 
relationship between fertility and gender equality could be different at different levels of 
economic development. This study aims to empirically examine the relationship between 
fertility and gender equality according to countries’ different income levels, using the 
integrated framework for both the fertility decline in developing countries and the fertility 
recovery in developed countries. This study employs the panel dataset including fertility and 
the GGGI (Global Gender Gap Index) published annually by the World Economic Forum. The 
main findings of this study are as follows: First, this study observes the inverse J-shaped ( ) 
relationship between fertility and the progress of overall gender equality measured by the 
GGGI. This means that progress toward gender equality has a negative relationship with 
fertility until a certain level of development is achieved, at which point the relationship 
becomes positive. The inverse J-relationship is also found between fertility and the progress 
toward gender equality in the economy. Second, in the “low-income and modest decline of 
fertility” country group, where the average total fertility rate was still over 5 in 2015, the 
progress in overall gender equality and in gender equality in the economy do not have a 
particular relationship with fertility. In contrast, female life expectancy is positively correlated 
to fertility. Third, the progress in gender equality in literacy is important for lowering fertility 
regardless of income level. In middle-income countries, progress in gender equality in school 
enrolment is negatively correlated with fertility in all education levels. 
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1. Introduction 
The fertility decline, which started first in developed countries, has been observed among most 
developing countries since the latter half of the 20th century. On the other hand, among 
developed countries, the long-lasting decline of fertility seems to have stopped in recent decades, 
and a modest recovery of fertility has been observed in most countries. 
A large number of studies focusing on the relationship between fertility and gender 
equality, as well as the relationship between fertility and economic development, have been 
conducted. However, gender equality is composed of various aspects, and the relationship 
between fertility and gender equality could be different at different levels of economic 
development. 
This study aims to empirically examine the relationship between fertility and gender 
equality according to countries’ different income levels using the integrated framework for both 
the fertility decline in developing countries and the fertility recovery in developed countries. 
Section 2 reviews related previous studies and explains the purpose of this study. Section 3 
shows the dataset and the methodology. Section 4 explains the results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review and the Purpose of This Study 
2.1 Literature Review 
2.1.1 Reversal of the Relationship between Fertility and the Progress of Gender 
Equality/Equity  
The literature review starts with recent studies that explained that the relationship between 
fertility and gender equality/equity changed from negative to positive through the progress of 
gender equality/equity. McDonald (2013) explained that “gender equity” was about perceptions 
of fairness and opportunity rather than strict equality of outcomes, while “gender equality” was a 
straightforward concept based on comparisons of outcomes for men and women in areas such as 
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education, employment, wages, participation, health, and so on. Esping-Andersen and Billari 
(2015) stated that, with respect to fertility, gender equity was considered more relevant than 
gender equality, however, gender equity was difficult to measure; in fact, measures of gender 
equality were often used as surrogate.1  
McDonald (2000) explained the long-term changes in fertility through the lens of the 
progress of “gender equity in family-oriented institutions” and the progress of “gender equity in 
individual-oriented institutions.” The transition from a high level of fertility to a population 
replacement level was mainly due to the progress of “gender equity in family-oriented 
institutions,” which started preceding “gender equity in individual-oriented institutions.” In 
other words, the decline in fertility was associated with women acquiring rights within the 
family that enabled them to reduce the number of their children. However, gender equity in this 
dimension progressed relatively slowly. On the other hand, the progress of “gender equity in 
individual-oriented institutions”2 started in the 20th century and progressed relatively rapidly. 
Then finally, the level of “gender equity in individual institutions” overtook the level of “gender 
equity in family-oriented institutions.” McDonald (2000) concluded that high levels of equity as 
individuals with continuing low levels of equity in the family at the end of the 20th century was 
regarded as the fundamental cause of the very low fertility in the region, and that very low 
fertility would persist unless gender equity within the family rose to much higher levels. 
McDonald (2013) observed that, in comparisons between countries, higher gender equity led to 
higher fertility. The study concluded that it was a sensible approach for governments to increase 
or sustain fertility through support of the combination of work and family for mothers. 
                                            
1 Other sections of this study use the term “gender equality” because both the empirical estimation in 
this study and previous studies which are referred to from the next section focus on the outcome 
variables. 
2 McDonald (2000) connected property rights, voting rights, and equitability with men in the labor 
market as “gender equity in individual-oriented institutions.” 
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Both Esping-Andersen and Billari (2015) and Arpino et al. (2015) showed a “U-shaped 
relationship” between fertility and the progress of gender equality/equity, using the data from the 
large scale surveys on people’s values.3 According to Esping-Andersen and Billari (2015), a 
society started at the first stage with high fertility and a traditional family style with a male 
breadwinner and female housewife. The second stage represented the situation in which the 
“female revolution” was advanced. However, during that stage, the society had not yet to adapt 
the revolution, and so fertility decreased. The third stage encapsulated the situation where 
“gender egalitarianism” had achieved dominant normative status and resulted in higher fertility 
than the second stage, because “gender egalitarianism” became increasingly more compatible 
with having children. 
 
2.1.2 Relationship between Female Labor Participation and Fertility 
Studies focused on the relationship between fertility and socioeconomic development have a 
much longer history than studies focused on both the decline and recovery of fertility phases. 
Among these studies, the impact of the increase in female labor participation in accordance with 
the socioeconomic development has been of particular focus. Becker played a leading role in the 
theories on declining fertility in developed countries. Becker (1960) called the amount of cost 
spent on children the “quality” of children, and stressed the importance of distinguishing 
between the quantity and the quality of children. Becker (1965) presented a theory of the 
allocation of time between different activities. The heart of the theory was an assumption that 
households were producers as well as consumers. An increase in earnings could increase the 
demand for the quantity of children; however, at the same time it would work as a disincentive 
for time-intensive activities such as child care. Many studies have been conducted in this area. 
                                            
3 Both studies used the data responding to the question “When jobs are scarce, men should have more 
right to a job than women: agree, neither, or disagree?” from the World Values Surveys and the 
European Values Studies. 
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Hotz. et al (1997) summarized that the relationship between the rise in female labor force 
participation and the decline in fertility had been an important focus of the economic models of 
fertility. 
Galor and Weil (1996) proposed a model combining the household’s fertility choice 
with a growth model using the gender wage gap. The model explained the positive link between 
fertility decline and economic growth. At first, increases in capital per worker raised women’s 
relative wages, because capital was more complementary to women’s labor input than to men’s. 
Increasing women’s relative wages reduced fertility by raising the cost of children. And then, 
lower fertility raised the level of capital per worker. 
In recent years, studies which focused on the reversal of the relationship between 
fertility and female labor participation from negative to positive at the high female labor 
participation level have been conducted. Feyrer et al. (2008) suggested the U-shaped 
relationship between fertility and female labor participation in the time series data of developed 
countries. According to the study, when the female labor participation rate was below 50–60 
percent, there was a steep negative relationship between fertility and female labor participation, 
while fertility would increase modestly when female labor participation was higher than 50–60 
percent. The study explained that when female labor participation began to increase to some 
extent without a corresponding improvement in their status in the family, disincentives to having 
additional children were strongest. In contrast, at the next stage when labor market opportunities 
began to equalize between both sexes, women’s bargaining power in the family increased. In this 
stage, men’s participation in the family increased, and disincentives for women to have children 
were reduced. The aforementioned McDonald (2013) also stressed the positive impact of the 
higher labor force participation rates on fertility in the highest income countries (see section 
2.1.5).  
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2.1.3 Factors Affecting Fertility: Health, Female Education, and Human Capital  
Studies focusing on factors affecting fertility such as health, female education, and human 
capital are also relevant to this study. According to the model by Easterlin and Crimmins (1986), 
in the beginning of socioeconomic modernization, the supply of children increased because of 
the increase in a couple’s natural fertility and the chances of child survival, while the demand for 
children decreased. The situation resulted in an oversupply of children and an increasing 
motivation for fertility control. At the same time, the cost of regulating fertility gradually 
declined. After the certain point when the pressures to limit family size grew and the cost of 
regulating fertility fell, the real fertility started to decline with fertility control to a level 
corresponding to the demand for children.  
Cleland and Wilson (1987), notable as the study on “diffusion”4 theory, postulated that 
attitudes towards birth control were of central explanatory importance to the fertility transition. 
The study also stressed the link between literacy and fertility, and the link between education and 
fertility.  
In more recent years, studies focusing on couples’ decisions taking human capital and 
education in account have been conducted. Lagerlöf (2003) set up a model in which couples 
substituted quantity for quality in children, as spouses’ levels of human capital became more 
equal and women’s time became more expensive. With the fertility decline, the rates of human 
capital and per capita income growth rose. The rising levels of human capital lowered mortality, 
making population growth rise. After that, as mortality leveled out and fertility continued falling, 
population growth started to decline, while per capita income continued to rise. Iyigun and 
Walsh (2007) explained that marital bargaining power was determined according to the incomes 
of the spouses. The model predicted that wives invested more than was Pareto efficient in their 
education to increase their bargaining power. 
                                            
4 “Diffusion” referred to the spread of information, ideas, and behaviors among individuals, 
communities, and countries (Bongaarts 2006). 
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Hazan and Zoabi (2006) focused on the relationship between children’s health and 
education. In the first phase of economic development, children’s health was very poor, and all 
additional resources for children were used to increase population growth. In the second phase, 
children’s health conditions improved, but not sufficiently enough to justify investing most 
additional resources on education. In the third phase, when children’s health was good enough to 
justify increasing the parental investment for children, population growth decelerated. 
Murphy (2015) comprehensively examined the regional fertility variations in France 
using département level data in the late 19th century. The study examined the OLS (Ordinary 
Least Squares) model and FE (Fixed Effects) model, and found that the male literacy rates and 
the gender gap of literacy rates were negatively correlated with fertility. The study also found the 
spatial dependence of fertility among départements, which suggested that diffusion of fertility 
played a particular role. 
Hazan and Zoabi (2015) focused on the reversal of the relationship between fertility and 
female education from negative to positive at the high female education level. The study showed 
that the cross-sectional relationship between fertility and women’s education in the US had 
become U-shaped. According to the study, highly educated women were recently able to have 
more children and work longer hours because of the decrease in the relative cost of childcare. 
  
2.1.4 Relationship between Fertility and Gender Equality Measured by the Data of the 
GGGI (Global Gender Gap Index) 
de la Croix and Donckt (2010) examined the relationship between the decline of fertility and 
several dimensions of gender equality. The study presented a model which was composed of two 
regimes called the “corner regime” and the “inner regime”. The “corner regime” was 
characterized by fertility at its maximum, high infant mortality, and a short reproductive period 
for women. In the regime, women devoted all their time to child rearing, and the motive for 
educating daughters based on the expectation for higher labor market returns did not exist. 
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Therefore, reducing the social and institutional gender gap didn’t impact fertility in the regime. 
After that, as mothers’ survival was promoted and infant mortality was curbed, women started to 
supply their time to the labor market, and then fertility would start to decline. Changes 
concerning health conditions for mothers and children were the key to moving from the “corner 
regime” into the “inner regime,” which was characterized by lower fertility, higher female labor 
supply, and higher economic growth. In the “inner regime,” reducing the social and institutional 
gender gap resulted in a decline in fertility. 
The study conducted empirical tests to examine the impact of the progress of gender 
equality on the “corner regime” and the “inner regime.” The cross country data of sub-indexes of 
the GGGI (Global Gender Gap Index) in 2007 was used for the estimations. The GGGI was the 
simple average of four sub-indexes, each of which stood for different gender dimension 
(economy, education, health, and politics).5 In the “corner regime” countries, the progress of 
gender equality in the economy, education, and politics did not relate to fertility, while in the 
“inner regime” countries, the progress of gender equality in those dimensions was proven to 
have negative impacts on fertility. In contrast, an increase in women’s life expectancy had a 
positive relationship with fertility in the “corner regime,” and a negative relationship in the 
“inner regime.”  
The GGGI was also used in Myrskylä et al. (2011). The study concluded that the 
positive impact of development on fertility in high development countries6 was conditional on 
gender equality. The conclusion was based on a comparison of the pace of the fertility increase 
against the average GGGI from 2006 to 2010 for 30 countries. 
 
                                            
5 The details of the GGGI are explained in section 3.1.1. 
6 The positive impact was examined by Myrskylä et al. (2009), which is presented in the next section 
(section 2.1.5). 
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2.1.5 Reversal of the Relationship between Fertility and Socioeconomic Development 
Most studies published until around 2000 assumed a negative relationship between fertility and 
the socioeconomic development. However, in recent years, another stream of studies, which 
focused on the reversal of the relationship between fertility and the socioeconomic development 
from negative to positive at the high development level, has been conducted. 
Myrskylä et al. (2009) showed the inverse J-shaped relationship ( )7 between fertility 
and the HDI (Human Development Index)8 using data from over 100 countries in 2005, which 
meant that the relationship between fertility and development changed from negative to positive 
at the higher stages of development. This proposition has been reexamined by other authors. 
Employing the threshold regression, Furuoka (2013) argued that even in countries with 
relatively high HDI levels, the relationship between fertility and the HDI was either slightly 
negative or had a flatter slope, and Harttgen and Vollmer (2014) found very little support for 
simple interpretations that fertility would automatically start to increase beyond a certain level of 
development. 
Luci-Greulich and Thévenon (2014) confirmed another inverse J-shaped relationship 
between fertility and per capita income in OECD countries. The study used panel data and 
focused on intra-country variations estimated through the FE model. Lacalle-Calderson et al. 
(2017) also found the inverse J-relationship. The study employed a conditional quantile 
regression. Among three per capita income level groups, the inverse J-shape was found only for 
the third tertile. The study found that the inverse J-shape depended on the fertility level as well. 
The higher the fertility, the higher the GDP per capita needed to reverse fertility decline. Both 
studies employed the quadratic function to estimate the inverse J-relationship.  
                                            
7 Myrskylä et al. (2009) described the curve as “J-shape.” However, the shape of the curve is like , 
therefore, this study uses the term “inverse J” for the curve. 
8 The HDI is published by the United Nations Development Programme. 
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McDonald (2013) stressed that such inverse J-shaped relationships were not the result of 
wealth alone but of higher labor force participation rates for women in the highest income 
countries.  
 
2.1.6 Change in the Timing of Child Birth 
As mentioned, the reversal of the relationship between fertility and the progress of gender 
equality/equity and the reversal of the relationship between fertility and the socioeconomic 
development could be regarded as two factors to explain the recovery of fertility in developed 
countries.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that the change in the timing of child birth affects TFR 
(Total Fertility Rate), which is the most popular indicator to measure fertility. 
Bongaarts and Feeney (1998) and Bongaarts and Sobotka (2012) explained that the 
recovery of TFR was due to the slowdown in the postponement of childbearing. During the 
period when postponement was occurring, fewer young women had children than previous 
generations did, while elder women had few children because they were already past the 
childbearing stage. This situation caused a lower TFR, which was the total of the age-specific 
fertility rates of a period (=a year) compared to the complete fertility of each cohort. The 
distortion was called the demographic distortion of period fertility. When the postponement 
slowed down, TFR recovery could be observed. Bongaarts and Sobotka (2012) concluded that 
the decrease and recent upswing of fertility rates were weaker when using “tempo (and/ or 
parity) adjusted TFR” which limited the variations of fertility rates due to changes in the timing 
of child birth. 
The aforementioned Luci-Greulich and Thévenon (2014) used not only TFR but also 
tempo adjusted TFR as the explained variable for the estimations of limited countries where 
tempo adjusted TFR was available. The study concluded that the reversal of the relationship 
 
11 
 
between fertility and per capita income was not only a mechanical consequence of the process of 
birth postponement coming to its end. 
 
2.2 Purpose of This Study and Expected Results 
This study aims to empirically examine the relationship between fertility and gender equality 
according to different income levels of the country, using the integrated framework for both the 
fertility decline in developing countries and the fertility recovery in developed countries. 
This study employs the 10 year panel dataset of the GGGI itself, its sub-indexes (on 
economy, education, health, and politics), and gender gap indicators. This study uses the panel 
dataset including fertility and the GGGI, while de la Croix and Donckt (2010) used the 
cross-country data of sub-indexes of the GGGI in 2007 and Myrskylä et al. (2011) used the 
average of GGGI from 2006 to 2010.  
This study estimates pooled OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) models and FE (Fixed 
Effects) models following Murphy (2015). However, this study focuses on the phases of both 
decline and recovery of fertility, while Murphy (2015) focused only on the declining fertility 
phase. For the estimation of the fertility recovery phase, this study assumes the quadratic 
functions as previous studies did. 
This study conducts estimations by income level (low-income, middle-income and 
high-income) with reference to Furuoka (2013) and Lacalle-Calderson et al. (2017). In the 
estimations, this study divides the low-income group into two sub-groups: countries with a 
relatively moderate decline in fertility and those with a relatively rapid decline in fertility. The 
introduction of two sub-groups in the low-income country group is expected to enable us to 
clearly examine the changes in the relationship between fertility and gender equality at the initial 
stage of the fertility transition, on which de la Croix and Donckt (2010) focused. According to 
the study, at the very beginning of the fertility transition (in other words, in the “corner regime”), 
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the decline of fertility was small, the progress of gender equality did not correlate to fertility, and 
female life expectancy was positively correlated to fertility.  
The hypotheses in this study are as follows: 
- There might be an inverse J-shaped ( ) relationship9 between fertility and the progress 
of overall gender equality, which is measured by the GGGI. Also there might be an inverse 
J-shaped relationship between fertility and the sub-index on economy.  
- In countries with “low-income and a moderate decline in fertility,” the GGGI sub-indexes 
on the economy, education, and politics might not have a particular impact on fertility, 
while the sub-index on health might have a positive impact on fertility. 
- In other income groups, the GGGI and its sub-indexes on the economy and education 
might be correlated to fertility. In particular, the relationship between fertility and the 
GGGI, and the relationship between fertility and its sub-index on the economy might be 
inverse J-shaped. 
 
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
3.1.1 Structure of the Dataset 
This study mainly uses the GGGI (Global Gender Gap Index), its four sub-indexes, and gender 
gap indicators which are used to calculate the four sub-indexes. Those data are published 
annually in the Global Gender Gap Report from the World Economic Forum. The report was 
first published in 2006 with the GGGI for 115 countries. In 2015 the report included the GGGI 
for 145 countries. The GGGI is the simple average of the four indexes: economy, education, 
health, and politics. To calculate the sub-indexes, the Global Gender Gap Report uses 14 gender 
                                            
9 Esping-Andersen and Billari (2015) and Arpino et al. (2015) called their curves concerning the 
relationship between fertility and gender equality/equity “U-shape.” However, the fertility recovery up 
to now is quite moderate, therefore, the term “inverse J-shape” is used for the estimation of this study. 
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gap indicators, all of which are female/male ratios of outcome variables. Each of those indicators 
is published data available at the time of calculation of the GGGI. For instance, gender gap 
indicators mainly from 2013 to 2015 were used to calculate the GGGI in 2015. For the GGGI 
and its sub-indexes, 1 refers to perfect gender equality, while 0 refers to inequality.10 Therefore, 
indices below 1 mean that the female position in those areas are below the male. 
This study also uses TFR (Total Fertility Rate, the number of children a woman is 
expected to have in a year), GDP per capita (constant 2011 international $), and female life 
expectancy at birth, all of which come from the World Bank World Development Indicators. 
Concerning the use of TFR, it should be noted again that TFR might have been affected by the 
change in the timing of child birth as explained in section 2.1.6.11 With those data, this study 
                                            
10 Construction of the GGGI (Global Gender Gap Index) from the World Economic Forum Global 
Gender Gap Report 
- The GGGI is calculated as the simple average of sub-indexes on economic participation and 
opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment. 
- For the GGGI and its four sub-indexes, 1 means perfect gender equality, while 0 means gender 
inequality. 
- Each sub-index is calculated from several global gender gap indicators in each area. When 
composing those indicators into the sub-index, a weight is assigned for each indicator. The weight is 
calculated according to the standard deviation per 1 percent point change of the indicator. 
- All 14 indicators are expressed as female/male ratios. The female/male ratios could be over 1, if the 
females’ performance is better than males’. When calculating sub-indexes, the Global Gender Gap 
Report truncates indicators at the “equality benchmark.” The indicators used for the calculation are 
as follows: 
[Sub-index on economic participation and opportunity] 
Ratio: female labor force participation over male values 
Wage equality between women and men for similar work (converted to female over male ratio) 
Ratio: female estimated earned income over male value 
Ratio: female legislators, senior officials, and managers over male value 
Ratio: female professional and technical workers over male value 
    [Sub-index on educational attainment] 
       Ratio: female literacy rate over male values 
 Ratio: female net primary enrolment rate over male value 
 Ratio: female net secondary enrolment rate over male value 
Ratio: female gross tertiary enrolment rate over male value 
    [Sub-index on health and survival] 
       Sex ratio at birth 
Ratio: female healthy life expectancy over male value. 
    [Sub-index on political empowerment] 
       Ratio: females with seats in parliament over male value 
 Ratio: females at ministerial level over male value 
 Ratio: number of years of a female head of state over male value. 
11 As mentioned in section 2.1.6, Luci-Greulich and Thévenon (2014) examined the estimations using 
 
 
14 
 
constructs the panel data set for 10 years (2006–2015) of 147 countries (the number of countries 
for which the GGGI was calculated at least once during the 10 years).12  
In addition, the dataset includes data on the countries’ policy stances on fertility in 2015 
from the United Nations World Population Policies Database. The data includes five possible 
policies toward fertility: raise, maintain, lower, no intervention, and no official policy. 
This study uses nine region groups: East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, North America, Eastern Europe, 
Western Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Central Asia.  
This study also uses three income groups: low-income, middle-income, and 
high-income. The three groups were according to the World Bank Analytical Classifications 
based on GNI per capita in US$ (Atlas methodology) using the data in 2015．The per capita 
incomes in 2015 of low-income countries are $1,025 or less. The incomes of middle-income 
countries are between $1,026 and $12,475. The incomes of high-income countries are over 
$12,475. In addition, this study divides the low-income group into two sub-groups by the ratio of 
changes in fertility from 2006 to 2015. These two sub-groups are identified as the “low-income 
and modest decline of fertility” country group, and the “low-income and rapid decline of fertility” 
country group. The “low-income and moderate decline of fertility” group is introduced to 
examine the situation at the very beginning of the fertility transition, which corresponds to the 
concept of the “corner regime” countries characterized by fertility at their maximum in de la 
Croix and Donckt (2010). The fertility transition is expected to start with the “low-income and 
modest decline of fertility” phase, then move into the “low-income and rapid decline of fertility” 
phase.  
                                                                                                                                
“tempo adjusted TFR.” However, this study does not employ the measure, because the measure is 
available for limited countries.  
12 Among 147 countries in the dataset, Syria and Cuba do not have the GDP per capita data.  
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Table 1 shows the summary of the dataset which includes totally 147 countries. 
However, out of the 147 countries, only 108 countries have the complete 10 year data of the 
GGGI. Therefore this study also considers the dataset which is composed of only 108 countries 
(Appendix 3.1 is the summary of the 108 country dataset), and even conducts several estimations 
for the 108 country dataset, too. All the countries in the dataset are shown in Appendix 1.  
Out of 18 low-income countries, 9 countries are included in the “low-income and 
moderate decline of fertility” group, while the remaining 9 are included in the “low-income and 
rapid decline of fertility” group. There are 80 countries in the middle-income country group, and 
49 countries in the high-income country group.13 
 
3.1.2 Levels and Changes of TFR and the GGGI 
3.1.2.1 TFR  
According to Table 1, TFR declined from 2006 to 2015 in the world overall, and in the low- and 
middle-income groups. However, in these areas, levels of TFR in 2015 were still higher than the 
population replacement level (around 2.1): 2.6 in the world overall, 4.9 in the low-income group, 
and 2.6 in the middle-income group. Of note, TFR in the “low-income and moderate decline of 
fertility” group was still 5.2 in 2015, much higher than TFR in the “low-income and rapid 
decline of fertility” group (4.5). In contrast, TFR in the high-income group increased slightly 
from 1.7 in 2006 to 1.8 in 2010, then declined to 1.7 in 2015; in other words, TFR in the group 
was far below the population replacement level throughout the period. 
Regionally, TFR in 2015 was higher than 4 in Sub-Saharan Africa , and over 3 in Central 
Asia. TFRs in the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, 
                                            
13 Out of 20 “inner regime” countries in de la Croix and Donckt (2010), 15 “inner regime” countries are 
included in the dataset of this study. Among them, five countries are included in the “low-income and 
moderate decline of fertility” group. Four countries are included in the “low-income and rapid decline of 
fertility” group, and six countries belong to the middle-income group. 
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and East Asia and the Pacific were between 2 and 3. TFRs in Eastern Europe, Western Europe, 
and North America were far below the population replacement level. 
According to Figure 1, the cross country data of TFR in 2015 and GDP per capita in 
2014 is inverse J-shaped. Figure 1 also shows that lower income and higher TFR countries tend 
to aim to lower their fertility (red dots), while higher income and lower TFR countries tend to 
aim to raise their fertility (blue dots).14 
 
3.1.2.2 GGGI 
According to Table 1, the GGGI and its sub-indexes basically increased in the estimation period, 
except the health sub-index which was already close to 1 in 2006. In other words, the total 
gender equality measured by the GGGI and the gender equality in economy, education, and 
politics measured by the corresponding sub-indexes progressed during the estimation period.  
The level of the GGGI was higher in the high-income group than the middle-income 
group, and lower in the low-income group than the middle-income group. However, in the 
“low-income and modest decline of fertility” group, the GGGI level was higher than the 
“low-income and rapid decline of fertility” group. 
Regionally, the GGGI was higher than the world overall in Western Europe, North 
America, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, East Asia and the Pacific, and 
Central Asia, while it was lower than the world overall in the Middle East and North Africa, 
South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
                                            
14 It should be also noted that most countries aiming to raise their fertility (blue dots in Figure 1) are 
situated below the red line which stands for the estimation result of the simple OLS regression of the 
samples. 
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3.1.2.3 Correlation Coefficients between Explanatory Variables 
The explanatory variables in this study, such as the GGGI, its sub-indexes, and GDP per capita 
could be correlated with each other. Therefore, this study checks the correlation coefficients 
between them. Appendix 2 shows the results. Obviously, the GGGI is well correlated with its 
economy sub-index in any income level. In contrast, the health sub-index does not correlate to 
the GGGI much. The correlation coefficient for GDP per capita with the GGGI is 0.336 for all 
samples. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
Using the dataset, this study conducts estimations to analyze the relationship between TFR and 
the GGGI and its sub-indexes. 
This study assumes the inverse J-shaped ( ) relationship between TFR and the GGGI 
and the inverse J-shaped relationship between TFR and GDP per capita. With the two 
assumptions, pooled OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) model (1) is tested.  
 
 TFRit = α0 + (α1GGGIit2) + α2 GGGIit + �α3lagGDPPCit
2� + α4lagGDPPCit + δr+ϵit                      (1)     
 
where TFRit stands for the TFR of country i in year t, GGGI stands for the Global Gender Gap 
Index, lagGDPPC stands for GDP per capita (1 year lag), 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟 stands for region dummies (East 
Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North 
Africa, North America, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, North America, and Central Asia). 
 All the data of the GGGI, its four sub-indexes, and the gender gap indicators which are the 
sources of the four sub-indexes are the values of around a year or two prior, as explained in 
section 3.1.1. 
Then, this study tests the FE (Fixed Effects) model (2) to examine the relationship 
between TFR and the GGGI. 
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TFRit = α0 + (α1GGGIit2) + α2 GGGIit + (α3lagGDPPCit
2) + α4lagGDPPCit + Zi + yeart+ϵit                (2) 
 
where Zi means the specific effect for the country i and yeart means year dummies. 
For equation (1) and (2), the expected signs of the coefficients are positive for GGGIit2  
and lagGDPPCit2 , and negative for GGGIit and lagGDPPCit . If those conditions are not 
satisfied, this study estimates equations without squared terms, in other words, drops terms in 
(   ). 
As the next step, this study tests the FE model (3) to examine the relationship between 
TFR and the GGGI sub-indexes.   
 
TFRit = α0 + (α1ECOit2 ) + α2ECOit + α3EDU + α4POL + α5HEA + (α6lagGDPPCit
2)  
              +α7lagGDPPCit + Zi + yeart + ϵit                                                                                                         (3)                                       
 
where ECO means the economy sub-index, EDU means the education sub-index, POL means 
the politics sub-index, and HEA stands for the health sub-index. Estimations with one sub-index 
at a time are also tested. 
As is the case with the GGGI and lagGDPPC, the squared term for ECO is included in 
the equation with the assumption of an inverse J-shaped relationship between TFR and ECO; if 
the signs for the coefficients do not satisfy the expected condition (positive for ECOit2  and 
negative for ECOit), then the squared term is deleted.  
For all the estimations that employ the quadratic function, this study calculates the 
turning points of the functions, which correspond to the bottom of the inverse J-shape. At the 
turning point, the correlation between TFR and its explanatory variable is expected to change 
from negative to positive. If the explanatory variable is smaller than its turning point, it means 
that the country is still in the downward portion of the inverse J, where the increase in the 
explanatory variable is negatively correlated to TFR. On the contrary, if the explanatory variable 
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is bigger than its turning point, it means that the country is already in the upward portion of the 
inverse J, where the increase in the explanatory variable is positively correlated to TFR. The 
calculated turning points are shown in the result tables. 
 
4. Estimation Results and Discussion  
4.1 World Total 
Table 2 summarizes the results for the OLS estimations with all samples. 
Both the inverse J-shaped ( ) relationship between TFR and the GGGI (estimation 2.1, 
2.2), and the inverse J-shaped relationships between TFR and the GDP per capita (estimation 2.3, 
2.4), are found in the result of the pooled OLS model. For both relationships, the R-sq (adjusted) 
is higher when introducing region dummies (estimation 2.1vs.2.2, 2.3vs.2.4). The impact of 
region dummies is especially obvious for the inverse J between TFR and the GGGI. Figure 2.1 
visually shows the inverse J-shaped relationship between TFR and the GGGI. The green line 
which stands for the estimation result 2.2 (with region dummies) demonstrates the inverse 
J-shape more clearly than the red line which stands for the estimation result 2.1 (without region 
dummies).  
Even if estimating those two inverse J-shaped relationships (TFR and the GGGI, TFR 
and GDP per capita) together, those two relationships are still observed and the R-sq (adjusted) 
reaches 0.8332 when introducing region dummies (estimation 2.5, 2.6). The estimated 
coefficients for region dummies in estimation result 2.6 suggest that the TFRs in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and North 
America are higher than in East Asia and the Pacific for the same GGGI and income level. In 
contrast, the estimated coefficients for Eastern Europe and South Asia are negative. 
Table 3.1, which shows the results of the FE model estimations, also supports the 
inverse J-shaped relationship between TFR and the GGGI (estimation 3.1.1, 3.1.3). However, as 
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shown in Figure 2.1, the inverse J-curve from the FE estimation (yellow line) is much flatter than 
the curves derived from the OLS estimations (red line and green line). In contrast, as shown in 
Figure 2.2, the inverse J-curve between TFR and GDP per capita estimated by the FE model 
(yellow line) seems much clearer than the curves from OLS estimations (red line and green line). 
Appendix 3.2, which shows the results of the estimations using the 108 country dataset, also 
supports the results. 
Table 3.2 uses four sub-indexes of the GGGI as the explanatory variables instead of the 
GGGI itself. The result of estimation 3.2.11 shows the inverse J-shaped relationship between 
TFR and the economy sub-index, and the inverse J-shaped relationship between TFR and per 
capita income. Also, the negative relationship between TFR and the education sub-index is 
observed.15 Concerning the health sub-index, no particular relationship is observed. 16 The 
results above are supported by other estimations in Table 3.2. Therefore, from the next section, 
all estimations are conducted without the health sub-index.  
Figure 2.3 visually shows the inverse J-shaped relationship between TFR and the 
economy sub-index. The curve is flatter for the curve from the FE model (yellow line) than OLS 
models (red line and green line), which might affect the difference of the shapes of the inverse J 
between TFR and the GGGI according to the models (Figure 2.1). 
 
4.2 Results According to Income Levels 
Table 4 summarizes the results of the estimations by income level.  
In the low-income group, negative relationships between TFR and the economy 
sub-index, and between TFR and GDP per capita, are observed (estimation 4.1, 4.6). In contrast, 
the GGGI does not correlate with TFR (estimation 4.1).  
                                            
15 See also Figure 2.4. 
16 See also Figure 2.6. 
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However, when focusing on the “low-income and modest decline of fertility” group, a 
negative relationship between TFR and the economy sub-index is not observed (estimation 4.7). 
Instead, a positive relationship between TFR and the politics sub-index, and a negative 
relationship between TFR and the education sub-index are observed (estimation 4.7). Based on 
de la Croix and Donckt (2010), this study also assumes the positive relationship between TFR 
and female life expectancy for the “low-income and modest decline of fertility” group.  
Appendix 4 shows the results of the estimations. As expected, a positive relationship is observed 
for the group (estimation ap.4.2), while a negative relationship is observed for the “low-income 
and rapid decline of fertility” group (estimation ap.4.3).  
Concerning the “low-income and rapid decline of fertility” group, a negative 
relationship between TFR and the economy sub-index is observed (estimation 4.8).  
For both the middle-income and the high-income group, the inverse J-shaped 
relationship between TFR and the GGGI, and the inverse J-shaped relationship between TFR 
and the economy sub-index are observed (estimation 4.4, 4.5, 4.9, 4.10). Also for both groups, 
the negative relationship between TFR and the education sub-index is observed (estimation 4.9, 
4.10). The inverse J-shaped relationship is observed between TFR and GDP per capita for the 
middle-income country group (estimation 4.4, 4.9), and the positive relationship is observed for 
the high-income group (estimation 4.5, 4.10). 
In conclusion, the inverse J-shaped relationship between TFR and the GGGI, and the 
inverse J-shaped relationship between TFR and the economy sub-index are observed in the 
middle- and high-income country groups from the estimations by income level. In contrast, in 
the “low-income and modest recovery of fertility” group, where TFR was still over 5 in 2015, 
the relationship between TFR and the GGGI, and the relationship between TFR and the 
economy sub-index are not statistically significant. Instead, female life expectancy is positively 
correlated to fertility. 
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4.3 Relationship between TFR and the Education Sub-Index 
This study tests equation (4) to further examine the relationship using four gender gap indicators: 
literacy, enrolment in primary education, enrolment in secondary education, and enrolment in 
tertiary education.  
 
TFRit = α0 + (α1ECOit2 ) + α2ECOit + α3LR + α4PE + α5SE + α6TE +  α7POLit 
              + (α8lagGDPPCit2) + α9lagGDPPCit+ Zi + yeart + ϵit                                        (4) 
 
where LR stands for the ratio of the female literacy rate over the male values, PE stands for the 
ratio of the female net primary enrolment rate over the male value, SE stands for the ratio of the 
female net secondary enrolment rate over the male value, and TE stands for the ratio of the 
female gross tertiary enrolment rate over the male value. As shown in Appendix 2.2, education 
gender gap indicators correlate to each other. Therefore, this study tests estimations with 
different combinations of education gender gap indicators as well.  
The results in Table 5 show that at any income level including the low-income group for 
which the education sub-index itself does not have a particular relationship with TFR 
(estimation 4.6 in Table 4), the progress in gender equality in literacy has a negative relationship 
with TFR (estimation 5.1,5.2, 5.3,5.7, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10, 5.11, 5.12).  
For the low-income group, coefficients for primary and secondary education are not 
statistically significant (estimation 5.1, 5.4). However, the positive coefficients for the tertiary 
education are observed in estimation 5.1, 5.4 and 5.10.17  
For the middle-income group, the coefficients for four education gender gap indicators 
are all negative and statistically significant in estimation 5.2, 5.5, 5.8 and 5.11.  
It could be concluded that the progress of gender equality in literacy is especially 
important for lowering fertility regardless of income level. In middle-income countries, the 
                                            
17 Concerning the positive sign of the coefficient of tertiary education, Hazan and Zoabi (2015) found 
that highly educated women in the U.S. were recently able to have more children because of the 
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progress of gender equality in school enrolments is negatively correlated with fertility at all 
education levels. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study aims to empirically examine the relationship between fertility and gender equality 
according to different income levels of countries, using the integrated framework for both the 
fertility decline in developing countries and the fertility recovery in developed countries. This is 
the first study which employs the panel dataset including fertility and the Global Gender Gap 
Index published annually by the World Economic Forum.  
The main findings of this study are as follows:  
First, this study observes the inverse J-shaped ( ) relationship between fertility and the 
progress of overall gender equality measured by the GGGI. This means that the progress of 
gender equality has a negative relationship with fertility until a certain level of development is 
achieved, at which point the relationship becomes positive. The inverse J-relationship is also 
found between fertility and the progress of gender equality in the economy. 
Second, in the “low-income and modest decline of fertility” country group, where the 
average total fertility rate was still over 5 in 2015, the progress in overall gender equality and 
gender equality in the economy do not have a particular relationship with fertility. In contrast, 
female life expectancy is positively correlated to fertility.  
Third, the progress in gender equality in literacy is important for lowering fertility 
regardless of income level. In middle-income countries, progress in gender equality in school 
enrolment is negatively correlated with fertility in all education levels. 
                                                                                                                                
decrease in the relative cost of childcare, as mentioned in section 2.1.3. 
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This study could be deepened if estimations using different groupings of income levels 
are examined. Also, estimations by region might be insightful. Furthermore, how the policy 
stance on fertility affects fertility and the progress of gender equality could be examined.
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[Figure 1] Total Fertlity Rate (2015) and GDP Per Capita (2014)
Notes:
- This figure includes 145 countries that have GGGI (Global Gender Gap Index) data in 2015.
  The GGGI data is from the World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report 2015.
- Total fertlity rate data and lag log GDP per capita data are from the World Bank World Develompent 
  Indicators.
  Lag log GDP per capita  stands for the 1 year lagged figure of the natural logarithm of GDP per capita
  (constant 2011 international $).
  For total fertility rate, data in 2015 is used. Lag log GDP per capita stands for per capita income in 2014.
- The colors of the dots stand for the policy stance on fertility in 2015.
  The data of policy stance on fertlity is from the United Nations World Population Policies Database.
  Red dots stand for countries where the governments aim to lower their fertility.
  Blue dots stand for countries where the governments aim to raise their feritility.
  Gray dots stand for countries where the governments seek to maintain their fertility, have a policy not to 
  intervene, or have no official policy on fertility.
  Each country's policy stance is shown in Appendix 1. 
- Country names corresponding to country codes are shown in Appendix 1.
- The red line stands for the equation below.
 TFR= 0.243lagGDPPC^2 -5.324*lagGDPPC + 30.768
          (-5.69)                  (-6.79)                  (8.65) (  ):t value
Adj R-sq=0.6735
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[Figure 2.1] Total Fertility Rate and the GGGI  (2006-2015)
   
Notes:
- This figure includes all the samples that have the Global Gender Gap Index from 2006 to 2015.
- Total fertility rate data is from the World Bank World Developemt Indicators.
- Global Gender Gap Index-related data is from the World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report.
- The colors of the dots stands for region groups.
   Countries included in each group are shown in Appendix 1.
   Red dots: East Asia and the Pacific
   Green dots: South Asia
   Bluishgray dots: Latin America and the Caribbean
   Olive dots: Middle East and North Africa
   Orange dots: North America
   Purple dots: Eastern Europe
   Lavender dots: Western Europe
   Yellow dots: Sab-Saharan Africa
   Pink dots: Central Asia
- The red line stands for the estimation result of 2.1 in Table 2. (OLS model without region dummies)
  The green line stands for the estimation result of 2.2 in Table 2. (OLS model with region dummies)
  The yellow line stands for the estimation result of 3.1.1 in Table 3.1. (Fixed effects model)
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Notes:
- This figure includes all the samples that have the Global Gender Gap Index from 2006 to 2015.
- Total fertlity rate data and lag log GDP per capita data are from the World Bank World Develompent 
  Indicators.
  Lag log GDP per capita stands for the 1 year lagged figure of the natural logarithm of GDP per capita
  (constant 2011 international $).
- The colors of the dots stand for region groups. For further information, see Notes for Figure 2.1.
- The red line stands for the estimation result of 2.3 in Table 2. (OLS model without region dummies)
  The green line stands for the estimation result  of 2.4 in Table 2. (OLS model with region dummies)
  The yellow line stands for the estimation result of 3.1.2 in Table 3.1. (Fixed effects model) 
[Figure 2.2] Total Fertility Rate and GDP Per Capita (2006-2015)
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[Figure 2.3] Total Fertility Rate and the Economy Sub-index
Notes:
-For information on data sourses and colors of the dots, see Notes for Figure 2.1.
-The red line stands for the result of the estimation below. (OLS model without region dummies)
  TFR=4.283*ECO^2 -6.155*ECO +4.747
          (2.25)          (-2.71)                 (7.15)  
 Adj R-sq=0.0118 ( ): t value
-The green line stands for the result of the estimation below. (OLS model with region dummies)
  TFR=6.923*ECO^2 -9.259*ECO +5.103+Region dummies  
          (5.94)          (-6.32)                 (10.96)  
 Adj R-sq=0.7044 ( ): t value
-The yellow line stands for the estimation result of 3.2.1 in Table3.2. (Fixed effects model)
[Figure 2.4] Total Fertility Rate and the Education Sub-Index
Notes:
- For information on data sourses and colors of the dots, see Notes for Figure 2.1.
- Green line stands for the equation below.     (OLS model with region dummies)
  TFR= -7.078*EDU +8.930+ Region dummies 
          (-31.03)           (39.56) 
 Adj R-sq=0.8234 ( ): t value
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[Figure 2.5] Total FertilityRate and the Politics Sub-index
Notes:
- For information on data sources and colors of the dots, see Notes for Figure 2.1.
 
 
  
 
[Figure 2.6] Total Fertility Rate and the Health  Sub-Index
Notes:
- For information on data sources and colors of the dots, see Notes for Figure 2.1.
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[Table 1] Summary of the Dataset
 
2006 2010 2015 2006 2010 2015 2006 2010 2015 2006 2010 2015 2006 2010 2015
Total  0.662 0.678 0.695 0.596 0.630 0.657 0.940 0.950 0.957 0.138 0.161 0.194 0.973 0.971 0.973
Low-income countries 0.615 0.640 0.678 0.632 0.652 0.700 0.764 0.793 0.842 0.098 0.147 0.201 0.968 0.967 0.971
Modest decline 0.626 0.643 0.685 0.671 0.660 0.722 0.758 0.793 0.848 0.108 0.155 0.199 0.968 0.966 0.969
 Rapid decline 0.605 0.636 0.672 0.592 0.642 0.678 0.770 0.793 0.836 0.088 0.138 0.202 0.969 0.970 0.972
0.650 0.663 0.680 0.574 0.601 0.619 0.940 0.951 0.960 0.116 0.132 0.167 0.972 0.970 0.972
0.689 0.710 0.725 0.617 0.667 0.701 0.986 0.993 0.994 0.180 0.205 0.233 0.975 0.974 0.974
0.674 0.686 0.698 0.648 0.677 0.706 0.961 0.970 0.974 0.116 0.126 0.142 0.971 0.970 0.970
0.608 0.639 0.653 0.440 0.482 0.508 0.823 0.881 0.927 0.209 0.235 0.209 0.959 0.957 0.966
0.664 0.691 0.708 0.560 0.626 0.648 0.980 0.991 0.993 0.137 0.169 0.213 0.978 0.977 0.979
0.588 0.601 0.612 0.431 0.440 0.450 0.909 0.937 0.946 0.043 0.058 0.085 0.971 0.970 0.968
0.710 0.739 0.740 0.744 0.788 0.800 0.990 0.999 1.000 0.128 0.191 0.190 0.979 0.979 0.972
0.686 0.691 0.710 0.670 0.692 0.706 0.990 0.993 0.995 0.110 0.110 0.164 0.973 0.968 0.972
0.716 0.746 0.764 0.629 0.694 0.735 0.993 0.996 0.998 0.269 0.322 0.350 0.975 0.974 0.975
0.636 0.654 0.683 0.626 0.659 0.694 0.838 0.845 0.873 0.110 0.143 0.190 0.970 0.969 0.972
0.685 0.688 0.696 0.713 0.717 0.705 0.983 0.959 0.970 0.066 0.103 0.135 0.979 0.972 0.973
GDP per capita, PPP (1 year lagged, constant 2011 international $ N of countries
and its natural logarithm in italic)
2006 2010 2015  2006 2010 2015
Total  18784 9.264 19562 9.331 19882 9.360 2.704 2.654 2.572 147 115 134 145
Low-income countries 1453 7.244 1543 7.307 1636 7.353 5.575 5.268 4.867 18 12 14 18
Modest decline 1630 7.389 1632 7.364 1714 7.397 5.658 5.446 5.218 9 6 8 9
 Rapid decline 1277 7.099 1425 7.230 1558 7.309 5.493 5.031 4.517 9 6 6 9
7995 8.795 9037 8.924 10394 9.078 2.854 2.742 2.581 80 59 71 78
37978 10.443 39530 10.483 41302 10.534 1.719 1.779 1.715 49 44 49 49
20792 9.503 23695 9.598 25413 9.706 2.029 2.050 2.051 17 12 15 16
3467 8.028 5322 8.385 6744 8.638 2.991 2.637 2.354 7 5 6 7
10576 9.143 12112 9.270 13537 9.392 2.565 2.358 2.226 26 20 26 26
27404 9.666 30908 9.864 31293 9.886 2.958 2.782 2.654 18 14 18 18
45117 10.712 44241 10.693 47389 10.762 1.847 1.779 1.722 2 2 2 2
15885 9.532 16825 9.599 18418 9.718 1.410 1.547 1.580 22 17 19 22
41911 10.603 42006 10.605 43066 10.621 1.648 1.699 1.609 20 20 20 20
3556 7.818 3778 7.869 4140 7.939 5.038 4.861 4.461 31 22 25 31
7151 8.494 7952 8.472 9771 8.659 2.483 3.069 3.111 4 3 3 3
Notes :
- "GGGI" and its sub-indexes are from the World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report from 2006 to 2015.
- "GDP per capita" and "Total Fertlity Rate" data are from the World Bank World Development Indicaters.  
- Countries included in each group are shown in Appendix 1. Concerning the income classification, see Notes for Appendix 1.
TFR (Total fertility rate)
Income
level Middle-income countries
High-income countries
Western Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa
2006 2010 2015
South Asia
Latin America and the Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa
North America
Eastern Europe 
North America
South Asia
Eastern Europe 
East Asia and the Pacific
Central Asia
Region
Central Asia
Region
GGGI (Global Gender Gap Index)
Economy Education Politics Health
Income
level Middle-income countries
High-income countries
East Asia and the Pacific
Latin America and the Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Western Europe
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[Table 2] Results of Estimations - Total Fertility Rate and Gender Gaps for All Samples (Ordinary Least Squares, 2006-2015)
Explained variable Ordinary least squares  
Total fertility rate All samples  
2.1  2.2  2.3  2.4  2.5  2.6  
Explanatory variables coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t 
 
Global Gender Gap Index ^2 35.219 5.504 6.40 *** 45.336 3.360 13.49 *** 35.471 3.394 10.45 *** 36.324 2.815 12.90 ***
Global Gender Gap Index -56.577 7.468 -7.58 *** -66.495 4.589 -14.49 *** -51.912 4.599 -11.29 *** -52.579 3.855 -13.64 ***
Lag log GDP per capita ^2 0.278 0.015 18.25 *** 0.121 0.014 8.80 *** 0.261 0.014 18.32 *** 0.124 0.013 9.81 ***
Lag log GDP per capita -5.964 0.279 -21.35 *** -2.807 0.255 -10.99 *** -5.601 0.261 -21.45 *** -2.784 0.235 -11.85 ***
East Asia and the Pacific baseline baseline baseline
South Asia 0.152 0.103 1.47 -0.127 0.094 -1.34 -0.298 0.088 -3.40 ***
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.350 0.069 5.06 ***  0.243 0.064 3.79 *** 0.319 0.059 5.40 ***
Middle East and North africa 0.057 0.085 0.67  0.819 0.068 11.98 *** 0.325 0.072 4.50 ***
North America -0.102 0.159 -0.64 0.224 0.145 1.54 0.247 0.134 1.84 *
Eastern Europe -0.441 0.072 -6.10 ***  -0.436 0.066 -6.64 *** -0.363 0.061 -5.99 ***
Western Europe -0.377 0.078 -4.84 *** 0.053 0.070 0.76 -0.034 0.068 -0.50
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.510 0.070 35.99 ***  1.558 0.075 20.68 *** 1.562 0.069 22.55 ***
Central Asia 0.963 0.128 7.52 *** 0.205 0.118 1.74 * 0.360 0.109 3.30 ***
Const 24.689 2.528 9.77 *** 26.265 1.574 16.69 *** 33.738 1.268 26.60 *** 17.714 1.178 15.04 *** 50.609 1.807 28.01 *** 36.112 1.680 21.49 ***
Number of samples 1334  1334  1316 1316 1316 1316
Adjusted R-sq 0.1821  0.7540  0.6515 0.8027 0.7034 0.8332
Turning point     
 GGGI 0.803 0.733   0.732 0.724
 Lag log GDP per capita   10.727 11.599 10.730 11.226
Notes :
- Data is from the World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Reports, and the World Bank World Development Indicators.
- *significant at 10 percent level, **significant at 5 percent level, ***significant at 1 percent level. 
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[Table 3.1] Estimation Results - Total Fertility Rate and the GGGI (Global Gender Gap Index) for All Samples
Explained variable Fixed effects with year dummies
Total fertility rate All samples
3.1.1  3.1.2  3.1.3  
Explanatory variables coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t 
Global Gender Gap Index ^2 16.490 1.437 11.47 *** 14.851 1.325 11.21 ***
Global Gender Gap Index -24.148 1.982 -12.19 *** -21.687 1.836 -11.81 ***
Lag log GDP per capita ^2 0.277 0.016 17.41 *** 0.243 0.015 16.05 ***
Lag log GDP per capita -4.991 0.291 -17.15 *** -4.350 0.278 -15.66 ***
Const 11.356 0.687 16.54 *** 24.742 1.343 18.42 *** 29.549 1.329 22.23 ***
Number of samples 1334  1316  1316  
Number of countries 147  145  145  
R-sq (within) 0.3539  0.4106  0.4828  
Turning point
 GGGI 0.732  0.730
 Lag log GDP per capita  9.009 8.951
Notes :
- Data is from the World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Reports, and the World Bank World Development Indicators.
- *significant at 10 percent level, **significant at 5 percent level, ***significant at 1 percent level. 
                   (Fixed Effects, 2006-2015)
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[Table 3.2] Estimation Results - Total Fertility Rate and the Sub-Indexes of the GGGI (Global Gender Gap Index) (Fixed Effects, 2006-2015)
Explained variable Fixed effects with year dummies
Total fertility rate All samples
3.2.1  3.2.2  3.2.3  3.2.4  3.2.5  3.2.6  
Explanatory variables coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t 
 Economic participation^2 1.525 0.342 4.46 *** 1.224 0.326 3.76 *** 1.207 0.325 3.71 ***
 Economic participation -2.143 0.426 -5.03 *** -1.830 0.405 -4.52 *** -1.815 0.405 -4.48 ***
 Education attainment  -0.287 0.204 -11.23 *** -2.297 0.202 -11.35 *** -2.293 0.202 -11.33 ***
 Political empowerment -0.174 0.088 -1.97 ** -0.190 0.083 -2.28 ** -0.191 0.083 -2.29 **
 Health and survival -0.504 0.807 -0.62 -0.721 0.760 -0.95    
Const 3.345 0.135 24.69 *** 4.791 0.194 24.74 *** 2.648 0.018 149.44 *** 3.109 0.784 3.96 *** 6.184 0.778 7.94 *** 5.477 0.227 24.18 ***
Number of samples 1334  1334  1334  1334  1334  1334  
Number of countries 147  147  147  147  147  147  
R-sq (within) 0.2737  0.3275  0.2579  0.2557  0.3477  0.3472  
Turning point
 Economic participation 0.703    0.748 0.752
Explained variable Fixed effects with year dummies
Total fertility rate All samples
3.2.7  3.2.8  3.2.9  3.2.10  3.2.11  3.2.12  
Explanatory variables coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t 
 Economic participation^2 1.973 0.330 5.98 *** 1.661 0.322 5.17 *** 1.661 0.321 5.18 ***
 Economic participation -2.810 0.420 -6.69 *** -2.456 0.408 -6.01 *** -2.456 0.408 -6.02 ***
 Education attainment -1.769 0.189 -9.37 *** -1.721 0.187 -9.21 *** -1.721 0.187 -9.22 ***
 Political empowerment -0.063 0.080 -0.78 -0.084 0.076 -1.10 -0.084 0.076 -1.10  
 Health and survival 0.292 0.728 0.40 -0.028 0.693 -0.04     
    
Lag log GDP per capita ^2 0.272 0.016 17.49 *** 0.251 0.016 16.14 *** 0.275 0.016 17.25 *** 0.277 0.016 17.39 *** 0.247 0.015 16.01 *** 0.247 0.015 16.07 ***
Lag log GDP per capita -4.927 0.285 -17.27 *** -4.497 0.286 -15.75 *** -4.969 0.292 -16.99 *** -5.001 0.292 -17.11 *** -4.431 0.283 -15.65 *** -4.432 0.282 -15.74 ***
    
Const 25.486 1.320 19.31 *** 24.066 1.297 18.55 *** 24.655 1.348 18.29 *** 24.513 1.460 16.79 *** 24.716 1.390 17.78 *** 24.694 1.282 19.27 ***
Number of samples 1316  1316  1316  1316  1316  1316  
Number of countries 145  145  145  145  145  145  
R-sq (within) 0.4361  0.4521  0.4110  0.4107  0.4749  0.4749  
Turning point
 Economic participation 0.712    0.739  
 Lag log GDP per capita 9.057 8.958 9.035 9.027 8.970 8.972
Notes :
- Data is from the World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Reports, and the World Bank World Development Indicators.
- *significant at 10 percent level, **significant at 5 percent level, ***significant at 1 percent level. 
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[Table 4] Results of Estimations - Total Fertility Rate and Gender Gaps by Income Level (2006-2015)
Explained variable Fixed effects with year dummies   
Total fertility rate
Moderate decline Rapid decline
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5
Explanatory variables coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t
Global Gender Gap Index ^2 14.911 2.359 6.32 *** 8.159 1.442 5.66 ***
Global Gender Gap Index -0.830 0.607 -1.37 0.686 0.602 1.14 -0.828 0.518 -1.60 -21.704 3.214 -6.75 *** -12.302 2.106 -5.84 ***
Lag log GDP per capita ^2 0.259 0.031 8.32 ***
Lag log GDP per capita -0.621 0.129 -4.80 *** -0.113 0.148 -0.77 -0.567 0.097 -5.87 *** -4.202 0.554 -7.59 *** 0.403 0.053 7.59 ***
Const 10.290 0.983 10.47 *** 5.877 1.087 5.41 *** 9.555 0.807 11.84 *** 27.261 2.687 10.14 *** 2.101 0.958 2.19 **
Number of samples 142 76 66  693  481
Number of countries 18 9 9 78  49
R-sq (within) 0.8703 0.8682 0.9792 0.4284  0.3151
Turning point   
 GGGI 0.728 0.754
 Lag log GDP per capita 8.112  
    Explained variable Fixed effects with year dummies  
Total fertility rate Middle-income countries
Moderate decline Rapid decline
 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10
    Explanatory variables coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t
 
Economic participation ^2  2.023 0.440 4.60 *** 2.285 0.354 6.47 ***
Economic participation -0.368 0.192 -1.91 * 0.124 0.154 0.80 -0.726 0.213 -3.41 *** -3.020 0.541 -5.58 *** -3.172 0.461 -6.88 ***
 
Educational attainment -0.204 0.306 -0.67 -0.505 0.286 -1.77 * 0.265 0.239 1.11 -1.427 0.291 -4.91 *** -1.495 0.425 -3.52 ***
 
Political empowerment 0.126 0.284 0.44 0.490 0.257 1.91 * 0.034 0.241 0.14 -0.061 0.107 -0.57 -0.019 0.079 -0.23
 
Lag log GDP per capita ^2 0.264 0.031 8.40 ***  
Lag log GDP per capita -0.646 0.129 -5.00 *** -0.114 0.141 -0.81 -0.575 0.091 -6.33 *** -4.245 0.559 -7.59 *** 0.379 0.052 7.31 ***
 
Const 10.321 0.976 10.57 *** 6.570 1.028 6.39 *** 9.330 0.717 13.01 *** 21.866 2.489 8.79 *** 0.321 0.684 0.47
Number of samples 142 76 66 693  481
Number of countries 18 9 9 78 49
R-sq (within) 0.8733 0.8889  0.9827 0.4376 0.3625  
Turning point  
 Economic participation  0.746 0.694
 Lag log GDP per capita  8.040  
Notes :
- Data is from the World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Reports, and the World Bank World Development Indicators.
- *significant at 10 percent level, **significant at 5 percent level, ***significant at 1 percent level. 
Low-income countries Middle-income countries High-income countries
High-income countriesLow-income countries
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[Table 5] Results of Estimations - Total Fertility Rate and Gender Gaps  (2006-2015)
        Focusing on the Education
 
Explained variable
Total fertlity rate High-income countries High-income countries
 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6
Explanatory variables coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t
Economic participation ^2 1.893 0.412 4.59 *** 1.850 0.396 4.67 ***  2.088 0.418 4.99 *** 2.375 0.391 6.08 ***
Economic participation -0.408 0.225 -1.81 * -2.775 0.508 -5.46 *** -2.636 0.512 -5.15 *** -0.309 0.225 -1.37 -3.006 0.516 -5.83 *** -3.262 0.508 -6.42 ***
　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　  　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Literacy rate -0.389 0.173 -2.25 ** -0.521 0.152 -3.42 *** -1.971 0.377 -5.22 ***   　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Primary education -0.044 0.268 -0.17 -0.501 0.254 -1.97 ** -1.560 0.477 -3.27 *** -0.155 0.269 -0.58 -0.664 0.249 -2.59 ** -0.867 0.450 -1.92 *
Secondary education 0.018 0.156 0.12 -0.462 0.158 -2.93 *** -0.011 0.406 -0.03 　 0.017 0.160 0.11 -0.591 0.159 -3.72 *** 0.370 0.407 0.91 　
Tertialy education 0.197 0.108 1.82 * -0.289 0.092 -3.13 *** -0.035 0.078 -0.45 　 0.205 0.111 1.85 * -0.274 0.094 -2.92 *** -0.151 0.078 -1.95 *
　 　 　 　 　 　 　  　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Political empowerment 0.232 0.296 0.78 -0.156 0.110 -1.43 　 0.048 0.078 0.62 　 0.198 0.302 0.66 -0.151 0.111 -1.35 　 0.042 0.081 0.52 　
Lag log GDP per capita ^2 　 0.210 0.031 6.73 *** 　 　 　 　  0.220 0.032 6.94 *** 　 　 　 　
Lag log GDP per capita -0.664 0.132 -5.02 *** -3.305 0.558 -5.92 *** 0.364 0.053 6.81 *** -0.624 0.134 -4.66 *** -3.438 0.566 -6.07 *** 0.405 0.055 7.39 ***
Const 10.513 1.004 10.47 *** 18.004 2.514 7.16 *** 2.398 0.994 2.41 ** 9.999 0.998 10.02 *** 18.242 2.560 7.13 *** -0.761 0.844 -0.90 　
Number of samples 130  628  437 130  632 441
Number of countries 17 77 48 17 77 48
R-sq (within) 0.8843 0.4714 0.4252  0.8783 0.4754 0.3752 　  
Explained variable
Total fertility rate High income countries High income countries
 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12
Explanatory variables coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t
Economic participation ^2 2.099 0.441 4.76 *** 1.620 0.358 4.53 ***  2.176 0.431 5.05 *** 1.572 0.395 3.98 ***
Economic participation -0.449 0.189 -2.38 ** -3.089 0.542 -5.70 *** -2.294 0.468 -4.90 *** -0.495 0.192 -2.58 ** -3.213 0.531 -6.05 *** -2.216 0.507 -4.37 ***
　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　  　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Literacy rate -0.446 0.164 -2.73 *** -0.322 0.158 -2.04 ** -2.276 0.329 -6.91 *** -0.425 0.161 -2.64 ** -0.456 0.156 -2.93 *** -2.203 0.364 -6.05 ***
Primary education 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　  　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Secondary education 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　  　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Tertialy education 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　 0.194 0.100 1.95 * -0.226 0.090 -2.51 ** -0.091 0.078 -1.17 　
　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　  　 　 　 　 　 　 　 　
Political empowerment 0.163 0.269 0.60 -0.033 0.108 -0.30 　 -0.043 0.076 -0.57 　 0.260 0.270 0.96 -0.067 0.113 -0.60 　 -0.032 0.078 -0.41  
Lag log GDP per capita ^2 0.283 0.031 9.04 *** 　 　 　 　  0.260 0.031 8.29 *** 　 　 　 　
Lag log GDP per capita -0.689 0.126 -5.46 *** -4.619 0.556 -8.31 *** 0.359 0.050 7.22 *** -0.660 0.127 -5.21 *** -4.173 0.561 -7.44 *** 0.362 0.054 6.68 *** 
Const 10.818 0.949 11.40 *** 22.660 2.496 9.08 *** 1.025 0.626 1.64 10.511 0.956 10.99 *** 20.840 2.512 8.30 *** 0.999 0.691 1.45 　
Number of samples 142  689 477 139  669 457
Number of countries 18 78 49 18 78 48
R-sq (within) 0.8808 0.4105 0.4155  0.8866 0.4418 0.4089  
Notes :
- Data is from the World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Reports, and the World Bank World Development Indicators.
- *significant at 10 percent level, **significant at 5 percent level, ***significant at 1 percent level. 
Low income countries Middle income countries Low income countries Middle income countries
Fixed effects with year dummies
Low-income countries Middle-income countries Low-income countries Middle-income countries
Fixed effects and year dummies
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[Appendix 1] List of Countries
Countryname Code Region Total
fertlity rate
Policy stance on fertlity Income group Complete
gggi
Mali MLI Sub-Saharan Africa 6.1 Lower Low-Income and Modest Decline of Fertility 1
Chad TCD Sub-Saharan Africa 6.1 Lower Low-Income and Rapid Decline of Fertility 1
Burundi BDI Sub-Saharan Africa 5.8 Lower Low-Income and Modest Decline of Fertility 0
Angola AGO Sub-Saharan Africa 5.8 Lower Middle-Income 0
Uganda UGA Sub-Saharan Africa 5.7 Lower Low-Income and Rapid Decline of Fertility 1
Timor-Leste TLS East Asia and the Pacific 5.6 Lower Middle-Income 0
Nigeria NGA Sub-Saharan Africa 5.6 Lower Middle-Income 1
Gambia, The GMB Sub-Saharan Africa 5.5 Lower Low-Income and Modest Decline of Fertility 0
Burkina Faso BFA Sub-Saharan Africa 5.4 Lower Low-Income and Modest Decline of Fertility 1
Mozambique MOZ Sub-Saharan Africa 5.3 Lower Low-Income and Modest Decline of Fertility 0
Tanzania TZA Sub-Saharan Africa 5.1 Lower Low-Income and Modest Decline of Fertility 1
Benin BEN Sub-Saharan Africa 5.0 Lower Low-Income and Modest Decline of Fertility 0
Zambia ZMB Sub-Saharan Africa 5.0 Lower Middle-Income 1
Cote d'Ivoire CIV Sub-Saharan Africa 5.0 Lower Middle-Income 0
Guinea GIN Sub-Saharan Africa 4.9 Lower Low-Income and Rapid Decline of Fertility 0
Senegal SEN Sub-Saharan Africa 4.8 Lower Low-Income and Modest Decline of Fertility 0
Cameroon CMR Sub-Saharan Africa 4.8 No official policy Middle-Income 0
Mauritania MRT Middle East and North Africa 4.7 Lower Middle-Income 1
Liberia LBR Sub-Saharan Africa 4.7 Lower Low-Income and Rapid Decline of Fertility 0
Malawi MWI Sub-Saharan Africa 4.6 Lower Low-Income and Rapid Decline of Fertility 1
Ethiopia ETH Sub-Saharan Africa 4.3 Lower Low-Income and Rapid Decline of Fertility 1
Madagascar MDG Sub-Saharan Africa 4.2 Lower Low-Income and Rapid Decline of Fertility 1
Yemen, Rep. YEM Middle East and North Africa 4.1 Lower Middle-Income 1
Ghana GHA Sub-Saharan Africa 4.0 Lower Middle-Income 1
Rwanda RWA Sub-Saharan Africa 4.0 Lower Low-Income and Rapid Decline of Fertility 0
Kenya KEN Sub-Saharan Africa 3.9 Lower Middle-Income 1
Zimbabwe ZWE Sub-Saharan Africa 3.8 Lower Low-Income and Modest Decline of Fertility 0
Pakistan PAK South Asia 3.6 Lower Middle-Income 1
Namibia NAM Sub-Saharan Africa 3.5 Lower Middle-Income 1
Jordan JOR Middle East and North Africa 3.4 Lower Middle-Income 1
Tajikistan TJK Central Asia 3.4 Lower Middle-Income 0
Egypt, Arab Rep. EGY Middle East and North Africa 3.3 Lower Middle-Income 1
Kyrgyz Republic KGZ Central Asia 3.2 Maintain Middle-Income 1
Lesotho LSO Sub-Saharan Africa 3.1 Lower Middle-Income 1
Swaziland SWZ Sub-Saharan Africa 3.1 Lower Middle-Income 0
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Israel ISR Middle East and North Africa 3.1 Raise High-Income 1
Guatemala GTM Latin America and the Caribbean 3.0 Lower Middle-Income 1
Syrian Arab Republic SYR Middle East and North Africa 3.0 Lower Middle-Income 0
Philippines PHL East Asia and the Pacific 3.0 Lower Middle-Income 1
Bolivia BOL Latin America and the Caribbean 2.9 Maintain Middle-Income 1
Algeria DZA Middle East and North Africa 2.8 Lower Middle-Income 1
Mongolia MNG East Asia and the Pacific 2.8 Raise Middle-Income 1
Botswana BWA Sub-Saharan Africa 2.8 Maintain Middle-Income 1
Lao PDR LAO East Asia and the Pacific 2.8 Lower Middle-Income 0
Oman OMN Middle East and North Africa 2.7 Maintain High-Income 0
Kazakhstan KAZ Central Asia 2.7 Maintain Middle-Income 1
Cambodia KHM East Asia and the Pacific 2.6 Lower Middle-Income 1
Saudi Arabia SAU Middle East and North Africa 2.6 Raise High-Income 1
Belize BLZ Latin America and the Caribbean 2.5 Lower Middle-Income 0
Fiji FJI East Asia and the Pacific 2.5 Lower Middle-Income 0
Panama PAN Latin America and the Caribbean 2.5 No official policy Middle-Income 1
Guyana GUY Latin America and the Caribbean 2.5 No intervention Middle-Income 0
Morocco MAR Middle East and North Africa 2.5 Maintain Middle-Income 1
Ecuador ECU Latin America and the Caribbean 2.5 Lower Middle-Income 1
Paraguay PRY Latin America and the Caribbean 2.5 Maintain Middle-Income 1
Honduras HND Latin America and the Caribbean 2.5 Lower Middle-Income 1
Uzbekistan UZB Central Asia 2.5 Maintain Middle-Income 0
South Africa ZAF Sub-Saharan Africa 2.5 Maintain Middle-Income 1
Dominican Republic DOM Latin America and the Caribbean 2.5 Lower Middle-Income 1
Peru PER Latin America and the Caribbean 2.4 Lower Middle-Income 1
Suriname SUR Latin America and the Caribbean 2.4 Maintain Middle-Income 0
Indonesia IDN East Asia and the Pacific 2.4 Lower Middle-Income 1
Cabo Verde CPV Sub-Saharan Africa 2.4 Lower Middle-Income 0
India IND South Asia 2.4 Lower Middle-Income 1
Venezuela, RB VEN Latin America and the Caribbean 2.3 No intervention Middle-Income 1
Argentina ARG Latin America and the Caribbean 2.3 Maintain Middle-Income 1
Nicaragua NIC Latin America and the Caribbean 2.2 Lower Middle-Income 1
Tunisia TUN Middle East and North Africa 2.2 Lower Middle-Income 0
Mexico MEX Latin America and the Caribbean 2.2 Lower Middle-Income 1
Nepal NPL South Asia 2.2 Lower Low-Income and Rapid Decline of Fertility 1
Bangladesh BGD South Asia 2.1 Lower Middle-Income 1
Maldives MDV South Asia 2.1 Maintain Middle-Income 0
El Salvador SLV Latin America and the Caribbean 2.1 No intervention Middle-Income 1
Bhutan BTN South Asia 2.1 Lower Middle-Income 0
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Turkey TUR Middle East and North Africa 2.1 Raise Middle-Income 1
Sri Lanka LKA South Asia 2.1 Maintain Middle-Income 1
Bahrain BHR Middle East and North Africa 2.1 Lower High-Income 1
Malaysia MYS East Asia and the Pacific 2.1 Maintain Middle-Income 1
Jamaica JAM Latin America and the Caribbean 2.0 Lower Middle-Income 1
France FRA Western Europe 2.0 Raise High-Income 1
Uruguay URY Latin America and the Caribbean 2.0 No official policy High-Income 1
Georgia GEO Eastern Europe 2.0 Raise Middle-Income 1
New Zealand NZL East Asia and the Pacific 2.0 Maintain High-Income 1
Kuwait KWT Middle East and North Africa 2.0 Raise High-Income 1
Azerbaijan AZE Eastern Europe 2.0 Maintain Middle-Income 0
Vietnam VNM East Asia and the Pacific 2.0 Maintain Middle-Income 0
Ireland IRL Western Europe 1.9 No official policy High-Income 1
Iceland ISL Western Europe 1.9 Maintain High-Income 1
Qatar QAT Middle East and North Africa 1.9 Raise High-Income 0
Brunei Darussalam BRN East Asia and the Pacific 1.9 No intervention High-Income 0
Sweden SWE Western Europe 1.9 No official policy High-Income 1
Colombia COL Latin America and the Caribbean 1.9 Lower Middle-Income 1
United States USA North America 1.8 No intervention High-Income 1
Australia AUS East Asia and the Pacific 1.8 Raise High-Income 1
United Kingdom GBR Western Europe 1.8 No intervention High-Income 1
Costa Rica CRI Latin America and the Caribbean 1.8 Maintain Middle-Income 1
Barbados BRB Latin America and the Caribbean 1.8 Raise High-Income 0
Chile CHL Latin America and the Caribbean 1.8 Raise High-Income 1
Bahamas, The BHS Latin America and the Caribbean 1.8 No intervention High-Income 0
Trinidad and Tobago TTO Latin America and the Caribbean 1.8 Maintain High-Income 1
United Arab Emirates ARE Middle East and North Africa 1.8 Raise High-Income 1
Norway NOR Western Europe 1.8 No official policy High-Income 1
Russian Federation RUS Eastern Europe 1.8 Raise Middle-Income 1
Belgium BEL Western Europe 1.7 No official policy High-Income 1
Brazil BRA Latin America and the Caribbean 1.7 No official policy Middle-Income 1
Belarus BLR Eastern Europe 1.7 Raise Middle-Income 0
Cuba CUB Latin America and the Caribbean 1.7 Raise Middle-Income 0
Lebanon LBN Middle East and North Africa 1.7 No official policy Middle-Income 0
Albania ALB Eastern Europe 1.7 Maintain Middle-Income 1
Finland FIN Western Europe 1.7 No official policy High-Income 1
Netherlands NLD Western Europe 1.7 No intervention High-Income 1
Denmark DNK Western Europe 1.7 No official policy High-Income 1
Iran, Islamic Rep. IRN Middle East and North Africa 1.7 Raise Middle-Income 1
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Montenegro MNE Eastern Europe 1.7 Raise Middle-Income 0
Latvia LVA Eastern Europe 1.6 Raise High-Income 1
Lithuania LTU Eastern Europe 1.6 Raise High-Income 1
Armenia ARM Eastern Europe 1.6 Raise Middle-Income 0
China CHN East Asia and the Pacific 1.6 Raise Middle-Income 1
Canada CAN North America 1.6 No intervention High-Income 1
Slovenia SVN Eastern Europe 1.6 Raise High-Income 1
Estonia EST Eastern Europe 1.5 Raise High-Income 1
Switzerland CHE Western Europe 1.5 No official policy High-Income 1
Bulgaria BGR Eastern Europe 1.5 Raise Middle-Income 1
Czech Republic CZE Eastern Europe 1.5 Raise High-Income 1
Macedonia, FYR MKD Eastern Europe 1.5 Raise Middle-Income 1
Romania ROU Eastern Europe 1.5 Raise Middle-Income 1
Ukraine UKR Eastern Europe 1.5 Raise Middle-Income 1
Germany DEU Western Europe 1.5 Raise High-Income 1
Luxembourg LUX Western Europe 1.5 Raise High-Income 1
Thailand THA East Asia and the Pacific 1.5 Raise Middle-Income 1
Austria AUT Western Europe 1.5 Raise High-Income 1
Croatia HRV Eastern Europe 1.5 Raise High-Income 1
Japan JPN East Asia and the Pacific 1.5 Raise High-Income 1
Serbia SRB Eastern Europe 1.5 Raise Middle-Income 0
Hungary HUN Eastern Europe 1.4 Raise High-Income 1
Malta MLT Western Europe 1.4 Raise High-Income 1
Italy ITA Western Europe 1.4 Raise High-Income 1
Slovak Republic SVK Eastern Europe 1.4 Raise High-Income 1
Mauritius MUS Sub-Saharan Africa 1.4 Raise Middle-Income 1
Cyprus CYP Western Europe 1.4 Raise High-Income 1
Poland POL Eastern Europe 1.3 Raise High-Income 1
Spain ESP Western Europe 1.3 Raise High-Income 1
Greece GRC Western Europe 1.3 Raise High-Income 1
Moldova MDA Eastern Europe 1.2 Raise Middle-Income 1
Singapore SGP East Asia and the Pacific 1.2 Raise High-Income 1
Korea, Rep. KOR East Asia and the Pacific 1.2 Raise High-Income 1
Portugal PRT Western Europe 1.2 Raise High-Income 1
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Notes:
- "Total fertility rate" stands for total fertility rate in 2015 from the World Bank World Development indicators.
- "Policy stance on fertlity " stands for policy stance toward fertility from the United Nations World Population Policies Database in 2015.
- "Income group" is based on the World Bank Analytical Classifications based on GNI per capita in US$ (Atlas methodology) using the data in 2015.
  The income of low-income countries is $1,025 or less. The income of middle-income countries is between $1,026 and $12,475. 
  The income of high-income countries is over $12,475.
  On top, this study divides the low-income country group into two sub groups according to the ratio of the change of TFR from 2006 to 2015.  
- GGGI data is from the World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Reports.
  If the " complete gggi" is 1, the country has 10-year GGGI data between 2006 and 2015, and if it is 0, the country has less than 10-year GGGI data.
- There is no GDPpc data for Cuba and Syria. 
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[Appendix 2] Correlation Coefficients between Variables
[Appendix 2.1] GGGI/ its Sub-Indexes / Per Capita Income [Appendix 2.2] Gender Gap Indicators for the Education Sub-Index
All samples (N=1316) All samples (N=1195)
GGGI Economy Education Politics Health Laglngdppc Education Literacy Primary Secondary Tertiary Economy Politics Health Laglngdppc
GGGI 1.000 Education 1.000
 Economy 0.764 1.000  Literacy 0.927 1.000
 Education 0.592 0.249 1.000  Primary 0.859 0.717 1.000
 Politics 0.756 0.332 0.177 1.000  Secondary 0.944 0.819 0.819 1.000
 Health 0.231 0.137 0.163 0.114 1.000  Tertiary 0.876 0.794 0.587 0.765 1.000
Laglngdppc 0.336 0.053 0.620 0.145 0.125 1.000 Economy 0.252 0.327 0.242 0.209 0.129 1.000
Politics 0.177 0.171 0.176 0.161 0.135 0.351 1.000
Health 0.164 0.176 0.131 0.140 0.144 0.154 0.116 1.000
Laglngdppc 0.633 0.645 0.404 0.528 0.695 0.047 0.173 0.133 1.000
Low-income (n=142) Low-income  (n=130)
GGGI Economy Education Politics Health Laglngdppc Education Literacy Primary Secondary Tertiary Economy Politics Health Laglngdppc
GGGI 1.000 Education 1.000
 Economy 0.739 1.000  Literacy 0.856 1.000
 Education 0.809 0.341 1.000  Primary 0.918 0.711 1.000
 Politics 0.774 0.467 0.415 1.000  Secondary 0.931 0.704 0.816 1.000
 Health 0.190 0.251 0.063 0.080 1.000  Tertiary 0.802 0.651 0.621 0.688 1.000
Laglngdppc -0.321 -0.394 -0.200 -0.179 -0.022 1.000 Economy 0.303 0.266 0.313 0.264 0.211 1.000
Politics 0.389 0.258 0.398 0.408 0.257 0.460 1.000
Health 0.064 -0.041 0.140 0.014 0.110 0.261 0.099 1.000
Laglngdppc -0.238 -0.171 -0.251 -0.268 -0.091 -0.453 -0.249 -0.025 1.000
Middle-income (n=693) Middle-income (n=628)
GGGI Economy Education Politics Health Laglngdppc Education Literacy Primary Secondary Tertiary Economy Politics Health Laglngdppc
GGGI 1.000 Education 1.000
 Economy 0.787 1.000  Literacy 0.895 1.000
 Education 0.714 0.464 1.000  Primary 0.832 0.665 1.000
 Politics 0.570 0.061 0.158 1.000  Secondary 0.932 0.783 0.770 1.000
 Health 0.172 0.062 0.129 0.058 1.000  Tertiary 0.803 0.642 0.451 0.682 1.000
Laglngdppc 0.159 0.014 0.505 -0.081 0.117 1.000 Economy 0.465 0.589 0.366 0.419 0.229 1.000
Politics 0.137 0.104 0.132 0.161 0.080 0.065 1.000
Health 0.134 0.150 0.086 0.135 0.094 0.083 0.055 1.000
Laglngdppc 0.516 0.420 0.305 0.423 0.638 0.000 -0.083 0.119 1.000
High income (n=481) High-income (n=437)
GGGI Economy Education Politics Health Laglngdppc Education Literacy Primary Secondary Tertiary Economy Politics Health Laglngdppc
GGGI 1.000 Education 1.000
 Economy 0.829 1.000  Literacy 0.545 1.000
 Education 0.434 0.367 1.000  Primary 0.382 0.063 1.000
 Politics 0.907 0.522 0.311 1.000  Secondary 0.350 -0.061 -0.049 1.000
 Health 0.275 0.281 0.190 0.166 1.000  Tertiary 0.833 0.170 0.111 0.215 1.000
Laglngdppc -0.035 -0.097 -0.164 0.058 -0.624 1.000 Economy 0.516 0.596 0.208 0.055 0.271 1.000
Politics 0.334 0.369 0.264 -0.041 0.157 0.565 1.000
Health 0.093 0.219 0.103 -0.073 -0.013 0.290 0.152 1.000
Laglngdppc -0.055 -0.136 0.024 -0.125 0.044 -0.090 0.079 -0.609 1.000
Notes :
- Calculated by the auther from the dataset of this study summarlized in Table 1.
-"GGGI":the Global Gender Gap Index, "Economy": the economy sub-index, "Education" : the education sub-index, "Politics": the politics sub-index, "Health": the health sub-index, 
 "Laglngdppc": the per capita GDP, PPP (natural logarithm, 1year lagged, constant 2011 international $)
 "Literacy" : the female literacy rates over male values, "Primary" : the female net primary enrolment rates over male values, "Secondary" : the female net secondary enrolment rates over male values,
 and "Tertiary" : the female net tertiary enfolment rates over male values.
- Figures over 0.7 are markered in orange.
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[Appendix 3.1] Summary of the Dataset for 108 countries
 
2006 2010 2015 2006 2010 2015 2006 2010 2015 2006 2010 2015 2006 2010 2015
Total  0.664 0.685 0.701 0.596 0.636 0.657 0.946 0.957 0.966 0.142 0.174 0.208 0.973 0.972 0.974
Low-income countries 0.613 0.631 0.661 0.630 0.631 0.671 0.755 0.784 0.839 0.098 0.141 0.165 0.969 0.969 0.971
Modest decline 0.630 0.622 0.656 0.704 0.608 0.678 0.726 0.767 0.827 0.119 0.147 0.154 0.969 0.969 0.965
 Rapid decline 0.605 0.636 0.664 0.592 0.642 0.668 0.770 0.793 0.845 0.088 0.138 0.170 0.969 0.970 0.974
0.652 0.669 0.684 0.574 0.610 0.620 0.945 0.956 0.964 0.118 0.138 0.179 0.972 0.971 0.974
0.689 0.715 0.731 0.617 0.669 0.701 0.986 0.993 0.995 0.180 0.225 0.253 0.975 0.974 0.974
0.674 0.692 0.703 0.648 0.683 0.705 0.961 0.971 0.976 0.116 0.145 0.160 0.971 0.971 0.971
0.608 0.637 0.654 0.440 0.460 0.465 0.823 0.859 0.914 0.209 0.274 0.271 0.959 0.957 0.966
0.664 0.690 0.707 0.560 0.618 0.638 0.980 0.989 0.991 0.137 0.175 0.222 0.978 0.977 0.979
0.585 0.599 0.613 0.427 0.442 0.450 0.906 0.924 0.938 0.038 0.062 0.096 0.971 0.970 0.968
0.710 0.739 0.740 0.744 0.788 0.800 0.990 0.999 1.000 0.128 0.191 0.190 0.979 0.979 0.972
0.686 0.695 0.713 0.670 0.697 0.707 0.990 0.994 0.995 0.110 0.116 0.175 0.973 0.973 0.975
0.716 0.746 0.764 0.629 0.694 0.735 0.993 0.996 0.998 0.269 0.322 0.350 0.975 0.974 0.975
0.643 0.660 0.682 0.634 0.665 0.697 0.851 0.867 0.891 0.118 0.138 0.166 0.970 0.969 0.973
0.683 0.701 0.706 0.700 0.721 0.704 0.993 0.997 0.995 0.062 0.107 0.151 0.979 0.980 0.977
GDP per capita, PPP (1 year lagged, constant 2011 international $) N of countries
and its natural logarithm in italic)
2006 2010 2015  2006 2010 2015
Total  19783 9.350 20198 9.431 21848 9.546 2.587 2.523 2.393 108 108 108 108
Low-income countries 1390 7.191 1534 7.305 1746 7.436 5.725 5.337 4.862 9 9 9 9
Modest decline 1616 7.375 1751 7.456 1950 7.561 6.189 5.947 5.553 3 3 3 3
 Rapid decline 1277 7.099 1425 7.230 1645 7.374 5.493 5.031 4.516 6 6 6 6
8238 8.829 9314 8.956 10830 9.112 2.769 2.686 2.560 55 55 55 55
37978 10.443 37622 10.459 39731 10.521 1.719 1.743 1.680 44 44 44 44
20792 9.503 22037 9.621 25982 9.825 2.029 2.025 1.972 12 12 12 12
3467 8.028 4119 8.195 5171 8.403 2.991 2.719 2.452 5 5 5 5
10576 9.143 11815 9.244 13492 9.382 2.565 2.407 2.255 20 20 20 20
28835 9.711 25904 9.722 26635 9.764 3.031 2.933 2.784 13 13 13 13
45117 10.712 44241 10.693 47389 10.762 1.847 1.779 1.722 2 2 2 2
15885 9.532 17515 9.644 19685 9.777 1.410 1.516 1.547 17 17 17 17
41911 10.603 42006 10.605 43066 10.621 1.648 1.699 1.609 20 20 20 20
3913 7.856 4419 7.978 5194 8.130 4.925 4.662 4.319 17 17 17 17
9192 8.726 10917 8.901 13384 9.067 2.530 2.850 2.965 2 2 2 2
Notes :
- "GGGI" and its sub-indexes are from the World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report from 2006 to 2015.
- "GDP per capita" and "Total Fertlity Rate" data are from the World Bank World Development Indicaters.  
- 108 countries included in this figure have 10-year GGGI data between 2006 and 2015. 108 countries are shown in Appendix 1 with  "comeplete gggi" =1.
- Concerning the income classification, see Notes for Appendix 1.
North America
Eastern Europe 
Western Europe
Income
level
Region
Sub-Saharan Africa
Central Asia
Middle-income countries
High-income countries
East Asia and the Pacific
South Asia
Latin America and the Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa
TFR (Total fertility rate)
2006 2010 2015
East Asia and the Pacific
South Asia
Latin America and the Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa
North America
Eastern Europe 
Western Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa
Region
Central Asia
Income
level Middle-income countries
High-income countries
GGGI (Global Gender Gap Index)
Economy Education Politics Health
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[Appendix 3.2] Results of Estimations - Total Fertility Rate and Gender Gaps for 108 Countries (2006-2015)
Explained variable Fixed effects with year dummies
Total fertility rate
ap3.2.1  ap3.2.2  ap.3.2.3  ap3.2.4  ap3.2.5  ap3.2.6  ap.3.2.7  
Explanatory variables coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t 
Global Gender Gap Index ^2 36.372 5.257 6.92 *** 46.125 3.441 13.40 *** 33.743 3.363 10.03 *** 35.194 2.801 12.57 *** 14.844 1.447 10.26 ***
Global Gender Gap Index -58.166 7.149 -8.13 *** -67.530 4.718 -14.31 *** -49.036 4.564 -10.74 *** -50.338 3.857 -13.05 *** -21.813 2.023 -10.78 ***
Lag log GDP per capita ^2 0.286 0.018 15.90 *** 0.148 0.017 8.89 *** 0.263 0.017 15.47 *** 0.141 0.015 9.21 *** 0.271 0.017 16.01 ***
Lag log GDP per capita -6.130 0.332 -18.45 *** -3.353 0.307 -10.91 *** -5.634 0.313 -18.01 *** -3.147 0.284 -11.09 *** -4.902 0.314 -15.63 ***
Asia and the Pacific baseline baseline baseline  
South Asia 0.242 0.115 2.11 ** -0.251 0.103 -2.43 ** -0.397 0.096 -4.13 ***
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.443 0.076 5.81 *** 0.257 0.068 3.76 *** 0.331 0.063 5.24 ***
Middle East and North Africa 0.186 0.095 1.95 * 0.917 0.073 12.59 *** 0.474 0.078 6.10 ***
North America -0.051 0.160 -0.32  0.264 0.143 1.85 * 0.269 0.132 2.04 **
Eastern Europe -0.409 0.079 -5.19 *** -0.420 0.069 -6.08 *** -0.354 0.064 -5.55 ***
Western Europe -0.331 0.081 -4.06 *** 0.094 0.072 1.30 -0.018 0.070 -0.26
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.437 0.080 30.60 *** 1.393 0.082 16.94 *** 1.441 0.076 18.97 ***
Central Asia 0.916 0.159 5.75 *** 0.317 0.140 2.26 ** 0.467 0.130 3.60 ***
Const 25.101 2.426 10.34 *** 26.549 1.625 16.33 *** 34.518 1.516 22.76 *** 20.483 1.415 14.48 *** 49.581 1.916 25.87 *** 37.016 1.804 20.52 *** 32.165 1.494 21.52 ***
Number of samples 1080  1080 1080 1080  1080  1080 1080  
Number of countries          108  
Adjusted R-sq 0.2149  0.7298 0.6391 0.7952  0.6902  0.8258   
R-sq (within)          0.4981  
Turning point    
 GGGI 0.800 0.732  0.727 0.715 0.735
 Lag log GDP per capita   10.717 11.328 10.711 11.160 9.044
Notes :
- Data is from the World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Reports, and the World Bank World Development Indicators.
- *significant at 10 percent level, **significant at 5 percent level, ***significant at 1 percent level. 
- Estimations are conducted for 108 countries which have 10-year GGGI data between 2006 and 2015. 108 countries are shown in Appendix 1 with 1 of "complete gggi".
Ordinary least squears
All samples
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[Appendix 4] Fertility and Female Life Expactancy 
Notes:
-This fugure includes all the samples which have the Global Gender Gap Index from 2006 to 2015.
-Total fertility rate and lag female life expectancy at birth (1 year lag) is from the World Bank World Development Indicatiors.
-For information on data sources and coloers of the dots, see Notes for Figure 2.1.
 
Explained variable Fixed effects and year dummies   
Total fertility rate Middle-income countries
Moderate decline Rapid decline  
 ap.4.1  ap.4.2 ap.4.3 ap.4.4 ap.4.5
Explanatory variables coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t
Economic participation ^2 2.308 0.438 5.27 *** 2.235 0.351 6.36 ***
Economic participation -0.396 0.193 -2.05 ** 0.099 0.131 0.75 -0.262 0.199 -1.32 -3.260 0.535 -6.09 *** -3.062 0.460 -6.66 ***
Educational attainment -0.152 0.309 -0.49 -0.470 0.243 -1.94 * -0.131 0.212 -0.62 -1.466 0.286 -5.12 *** -1.447 0.422 -3.43 ***
Political empowerment 0.099 0.285 0.35 0.284 0.222 1.28 -0.015 0.198 -0.07 -0.076 0.106 -0.72 -0.009 0.079 -0.12
Lag female life expectancy at birth 0.010 0.008 1.20 0.029 0.006 4.68 *** -0.031 0.006 -4.78 *** -0.020 0.004 -4.54 *** 0.027 0.010 2.67 ***
Lag log GDP per capita ^2 0.222 0.032 6.87 ***
Lag log GDP per capita -0.712 0.140 -5.08 *** -0.314 0.127 -2.46 ** -0.371 0.086 -4.34 *** -3.480 0.575 -6.05 *** 0.375 0.051 7.28 ***
Const 10.177 0.982 10.37 *** 6.367 0.874 7.29 *** 9.764 0.593 16.46 *** 19.947 2.485 8.03 *** -1.957 1.090 -1.80 *
Number of samples 142  76 66 693  481
Number of countries 18 9 9 78 49
R-sq (within) 0.8749 0.9214  0.9887 0.4563 0.3733  
Notes :
- Data is from the World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Reports, and the World Bank World Development Indicators.
- *significant at 10 percent level, **significant at 5 percent level, ***significant at 1 percent level. 
- TFR_it= α_0+〖(α_1 ECO_it^2)+α_2 ECO_it+α_3 EDU＋α_4 POL_it+α_5 lagFLE_it  +α_6 lagGDPPC_it^2 +α_7 lagGDPPC_it+ Z_i+year_t+ϵ_it
High-income countriesLow-income countries
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Abstract (in Japanese) 
要約 
 
先進国から始まった出生率の低下は、20世紀後半には殆どの途上国に広がった。一方、
先進国においては、近年、出生率の下げ止まりや緩やかな回復が見られる。 
出生率とジェンダー平等については既に多くの研究が行われている。しかし、ジェン
ダー平等には多様な側面があり、また、出生率とジェンダー平等の関係は国の発展段
階によって異なる可能性がある。このため本研究では、出生率と世界経済フォーラム
が毎年発表している GGGI（グローバルジェンダーギャップ指数）を含むパネルデータ
を用い、途上国と先進国に共通の枠組みで出生率とジェンダー平等の関係を国の所得
段階毎に実証分析した。 
主な結果は以下である。第 1に、出生率と GGGIでみたジェンダー平等全体の進展との
間には逆 J 字型( )の関係が観察される。即ち、ジェンダー平等と出生率の関係は、
その進展の初期において負であるが、一定水準以上になると正に転じる。第 2に、2015
年の出生率が 5 を上回っている低所得でかつ出生率の低下が緩やかな国では、ジェン
ダー平等全体や経済分野におけるジェンダー平等の進展と出生率の間に明確な関係が
みられない一方、女性の平均寿命は出生率と正の関係がある。第 3 に、教育分野につ
いては、識字率に関するジェンダー平等の進展が所得水準とかかわりなく出生率と負
の関係にあり、また、中所得国では初等・中等・高等教育の各段階で就学率のジェン
ダー平等の進展と出生率に負の関係がみられる。 
 
 
キーワード：出生率、ジェンダー平等、グローバルジェンダーギャップ指数、 
所得レベル 
 
